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Introduction
The Society of Jesus was no stranger to missionary work in foreign and
distant places. Founded in 1540,1 the Society of Jesus, or the Jesuits, rivaled,
even eclipsed, all of the more established religious orders in global missionary
work: mainly the Order of St. Dominic, or the Dominicans; the Order of St.
Francis, or the Franciscans; and the Order of St. Augustine, or the Augustinians.
By the late sixteenth century, the Society already had mission stations in the
Americas and India, and already had a presence in Japan and China. Their
success in missionary work had been nothing short of extraordinary.
The Jesuits had a military-like organization. Owing to the background of
their founder Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), who was a soldier of noble birth,2
the Jesuits, more than any of the other orders, were men of action. They did
highly value their spiritual exercises but at the same time, they also maintained
that communication with god, and the perfection of their relationship with him
could also “be attained by the exercise of the natural human capacities.”3 In
contrast, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Augustinians, having been
founded in the thirteenth century, were rather devoted to the hermetic way of life;
and for them, preaching the gospel to non-believers was simply secondary to their
lives of contemplative prayers. Additionally, the very nature of their
evangelization seemed to be geared toward a heavy-handed rebuke of what they
considered to be heresies and idolatries. Their approach to evangelization was
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Paul Van Dyke, Ignatius Loyola: The Founder of the Jesuits (Port Washington:
Ibid., 14-28.!
3
Rene Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus (New York: Capricorn
Books, 1963), 4.
2

one of the castigation and extirpation of these heresies. In not so many words,
their method of proselytization was simple and clear – their Christian god was the
one true god, and their Catholic Church the one true church; non-Christian deities
were merely condemned as idols, and other religious traditions mere heresies.
The Jesuits, however, were tolerant of other religious traditions, realizing that this
was the most effective way to penetrate tightly knit societies and be able to preach
and ultimately convert people to Christianity. Diplomacy and accommodation in
dealing with non-Christians became integral features of their evangelization work.
This was not at all surprising as social interaction and community service were
important parts of their formation as members of the Society; these activities
served as extensions of their personal prayers and spiritual meditations. This
aspect of their missionary activity was most evidently demonstrated in their
missions in China, Japan, and Vietnam.
In the Philippines, meanwhile, the presence of a Spanish colonial
infrastructure demanded more than just mere diplomacy and accommodation.
Exigent circumstances in the islands – state administration, civil and ecclesiastical
conflicts, native pacifications and conversions, internal disagreements among the
religious, among others – meant that community action had to assume a more
radical guise – that of political maneuverings and strategies.
But ‘politics’ and ‘to be political’ have meant different things in different
situations. Indeed, the word, ‘politics’, has been used to describe anything from
affairs of state to inter-office relations. In this study, ‘politics’ refers to the
alliances the Jesuits crafted with colonial powers and the tactics they employed to
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either gain or maintain such alliances. It will also contextualize the term,
establishing parameters for our usage of the word that is essential in
understanding the argument and the support presented herein.
This contextual meaning of politics is historically placed in Counter
Reformation Europe. The Society of Jesus was founded at a time when the
Catholic Church realized the exigent need for change to stem the spread of
Protestantism, and to adapt to the growth of humanist values. To these pressing
concerns, the Church responded with measures to reform its organization,
demonstrating an intention to accommodate progressive ideals, and a willingness
to discuss and question traditional Catholic doctrines.4 The Society of Jesus, in its
establishment and formation, therefore, took into consideration the prevailing
reformist ideals in the period, but simultaneously, acknowledged the structures of
the Catholic Church and the restrictions it imposed on its members. Between this
legacy of conformity and this new idea of self expression, the members of the
order found “wiggle room” for agency, discovered a middle-ground, a
comfortable compromise. Politics, therefore, at least in the Jesuit sense, meant a
form of agency that interacted with the powers of colonial governments. They
may, in some instances, have overstepped in the execution of these expressions,
but as we shall discuss in the following paragraphs, the Jesuit moral code
provided a license for incursions into questionable extra-ecclesiastical regions.5
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Eugene F. Rice, Jr. and Anthony Grafton, The Foundations of Early Modern Europe,
1460-1559, 2nd Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), 171-173.
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Acting as ‘politicians’, the Jesuits have assumed the positions of advisors
to heads of nations, confessors to kings and emperors, teachers to future rulers,
state representatives, ambassadors, power brokers, and personal confidantes.
These roles did not require the members of the order to directly effect policy,
instead they provided the perfect avenue to influence policy makers. Through
holding these offices, the Jesuits have successfully married their adherence to
structure and tradition and their espousal of agency and humanist ideals.
The use of politics among the Jesuits should not come as a surprise despite
the religious nature of the order. In fact, the moral philosophy of the Society,
although not explicit about it, condoned the use of politics by its members:
The Jesuits now hold the view that in many instances, a good
intention can justify even the choice of less good means. They
contend that, in the abstract, man’s moral consciousness is
certainly primarily disposed to regard the application of immoral
means to a moral end as essentially to be condemned; in practical
life, however, innumerable instances, have, over and over again,
tended to lead to the opposite conclusion. How often does it not
happen that we are compelled to tell a lie to avoid injuring
someone, and it is easy to conceive of a case in which a lie might
be the means of saving a person’s life.6
This political exposition becomes clearer and more precise: “… man’s
moral consciousness may place the ultimate purpose of an act on a higher plane
than the means by which it is attained.”7 In essence, for the Society, the end did
justify the means. This notion of Jesuit moral philosophy may have different
interpretations depending on the reader. But one thing is consistently gleaned,
even extracted, from this short discourse – that political calculations, understood
in the Jesuit sense, is an acceptable, moral tool in community and social relations,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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or state relations at large, for the members of the Society of Jesus. Thus, in
evangelization and for the survival of the Society of Jesus as a religious order, a
more delicate and sensitive approach to missionary work – the employment of a
political agenda – was more than necessary; it was practically essential.
The Jesuits, therefore, were a new breed of missionaries, very different
from what the Catholic community had seen in the past. The very reason for their
establishment was to help reform the same institution responsible for their
founding. And yet, when they were established, the legacy of regulation and
censure still very much pervaded the Catholic Church. This rather circuitous
origin of the order provided them with a measure of liberation from the
constraints of strict adherence to rules and dogmatic principles, but at the same
time, placed them at the center of the institution from where all these authority
and control originate. As such, this paper focuses on how, under these
circumstances, this new breed of Catholic evangelists existed, adapted, survived,
and even flourished. Throughout this paper, I argue that the Jesuits positioned
themselves, at least during this period, in that middle ground of adherence to
tradition and expressions of political agency, a middle ground between the
Catholic Church’s dogmatic teachings and the emerging humanist values that
increasingly became more important and influential in this period; and that
expressions of this compromise were demonstrated in the Jesuits’ political
activities to the extent that both traditional Catholic doctrines were respected and
pragmatic virtues were integrated and applied. This new sense of agency reached
its fullest expression as the Jesuits assumed the roles of advisors, government
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agents, counselors, confessors, ambassadors, brokers, and other offices that
require less than direct involvement in non-ecclesiastical affairs. This essentially
was true for the Jesuits’ political activity in the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries – existing within the broader traditions of the Catholic
Church, but working toward the acceptance and application of humanist ideals in
response to an age where the interconnectedness of people, continents, and
religious were becoming more important and more apparent.
In the succeeding discussion, I elaborate on how Jesuit understanding of
their contemporary surroundings made them realize the importance to adapt
politically, and to employ political machinations to survive in a constantly
changing world. The following section is divided into three parts: the first part
concerns Alonso Sánchez, a very talented, and persuasive Jesuit who gave
legitimacy to Spanish colonial claims over the Philippine islands, and its
succeeding occupation; the second part is about Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, a
governor general of the islands, who found himself embroiled in bitter disputes
with church officials but also found friends and allies among the Jesuit fathers;
and the third part looks at the Jesuit expulsion from the Philippines, which
showed the involvement of international developments in colonial cities. This
paper demonstrates how Jesuit political activity and skill were manifested – using
these three examples – first, as an active and vocal participant, in the colonial
process, second, as a supporting element in colonial politics, and lastly, as an
organization defending itself against external and internal threats. Strikingly
different, yet equally effective, these political strategies yielded much benefit to
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the Jesuits, from their arrival in the Philippines in 1581 up to their expulsion from
the Spanish Empire in 1768.

Historiography
The history of the Jesuits in the Philippines remains understudied in the
historiography of the global Catholic Church history. As such, there are only five
main studies of the history of the order in the Philippines. In 1939, W.C. Repetti
edited a three-volume tome called the History of the Society of Jesus in the
Philippine Islands.8 Primarily relying on information found in the archives in
Seville, he carefully reconstructed the events pertaining to the order in the
Philippines for the last three hundred years. The last extensive work on the order
was The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768,9 published in 1967. The author,
Horacio de la Costa, himself a Jesuit, naturally had an agenda in writing this
book. Purging it of a lot of non-religious elements, he attempted to paint the
history of his order using exclusively religious hues. The result was essentially a
history of the missionary work of the Jesuits, and not a history of the Jesuits as an
institution, as products of the tension between tradition and progress, between
allegiance to the king and obedience to the pope, and between their moral
responsibility to spread Christianity and their humanist value to respect the rights
of the natives. It seemed de la Costa was conscious of this purging, for the
sources he referenced made some mention of the non-religious activities of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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order. These two works comprise the secondary sources exclusively dedicated to
the history of the order in the country.
Many of the materials still used date from the early modern period.
Claudio Acquaviva, the Society’s general in 1590, cognizant of the importance of
meticulous record keeping and documentation, instructed the Jesuits in the
Philippines to chronicle the activities of the order for posterity.10 The result was
a three-volume comprehensive history of the order, spanning the years 15821716. The first one was Pedro Chirino’s Relacion de las Islas Filipinas y de lo
que en ellas han trabajado los padres de la Compañia de Jesus, published in
1604. In 1660, in response to a request of Philip IV11, Francisco Cólin published
his work in 1663 under the title, Labor Evangélica, ministerios apostólicos de los
obreros de la Compañia de Jesús. Fundación y progresos de su provincia en las
Islas Filipinas.12 And lastly, in 1749, Pedro Murillo Velarde published Historia
de la Provincia de Filipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, Segunda Parte, que
comprehende los progresos de esta provincia desde el año de 1616 hasta el de
1716.13 Murillo’s work “is a continuation of Labor Evangelica…, which at the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Pedro Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas y de lo que en ellas han trabajado los
padres de la Compañia de Jesus, 2nd Ed., (1604, repr., Manila: Imprenta de D. Esteban Balbas,
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time built on the unedited, unpublished Chirino work, Primera Parte de la
Historia de la Provincia de Filipinas de al Compañia de Jesús. Thus, Murillo
Velarde’s work completes the official chronicle of the first phase of the history of
the Society of Jesus in the Philippines.”14 These three works are the most cited on
the topic of the Jesuits in the Philippines. Although each had its bias, they are,
nonetheless, significant in that they were written when the country was still a
colony of Spain, giving the reader first-hand observations on how state and
church relations, both with each other and within itself, affected colonial
administration.
These five volumes are the principal sources for the history of the Society
of Jesus in the Philippines. Although written by members of the order with a
specific purpose in mind, the information contained therein provides the
contextual backdrop for this work. Further, the information they do not provide
or deliberately withhold ascribes purpose and a measure of urgency to this
research. Focusing on the political aspects of Jesuit activities in the Philippines,
this paper aims to demonstrate a gap in the literature, while simultaneously filling
that gap with original research and persuasive exposition.
Few, if any, comprehensive works have been published on the subject
since de la Costa’s The Jesuits in the Philippines. If there were any, most of them
were either book chapter contributions or journal articles. Apart from Repetti’s
work, all other histories of the Jesuits have been written by members of the order,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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which necessarily colors the narrative favorably to the Jesuits. This paper seeks
to provide a different perspective, specifically an angle of non-Jesuit provenance,
on the long history of the order in the islands.

Early Spanish Philippines
When Miguel Lopez de Legazpi founded the first Spanish settlement in
the island of Cebu in 1565, he not only affirmed Spain’s temporal dominion over
what would be the Philippine Islands, but he also established the Catholic
Church’s spiritual mission to spread Catholicism throughout the region. As the
representative of the king of Spain, Legazpi, who later became the first governor
of the islands, embodied in him both political and ecclesiastical powers, as well as
the responsibilities that accompany such an office. With that in mind, the
Philippines became just as much part of Christendom, as it was part of the
Spanish Empire.15
This duality in authority and purpose was in accordance with the
agreement struck between the king of Spain and the Pope, known as patronato
real or royal patronage. Historian Charles Cunningham, quoting from
Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, described it as an arrangement
whereby the pope assigns to the Spanish king the right to nominate candidates to
church offices, to assign provinces to missionary orders, and to confirm junior
religious appointments. In exchange the Spanish government sees to the well-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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being, and safety of all church personnel.16 As a result, royal patronage provided
for the inextricable collaboration of the church and state in Spain’s colonies.17
Indeed, this was the defining characteristic of Spanish imperialism – a kind of
imperialism that went beyond the pursuit of national prestige and economic gain,
a kind of imperialism that promoted European civilization through the spread of
Catholicism, over than a mere annexation of foreign territories, and a subjugation
of native inhabitants.
This kind of imperialism differed greatly from British or Dutch
imperialism. It even differed with Portuguese imperialism where, although
spreading the Catholic faith was considered of great importance, its primary
purpose was to identify new sources for materials and markets for its domestically
made goods; Portuguese imperialism did not seek to supplant the culture of the
lands they conquered. Spanish imperialism, as hinted above, not only imposed
Spanish culture on the lands they politically annexed, but they also sought to
establish Catholicism as the only religion in the empire, and at the very beginning
of each conquest, enlisted the support of the Catholic Church in its colonial
enterprise.18
Under this colonial framework, the religious orders of the Catholic Church
established themselves in the Philippines. The Augustinians, who came with
Legazpi in 1565, achieved much success in converting the natives to Christianity.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, 1-6-1 to 7. As cited in Charles Henry
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In 1573, Guido de Lavezares, Legazpi’s successor as governor, wrote to Philip II
requesting more missionaries, especially Jesuit missionaries, to be sent to the
islands.19 The Spanish Crown responded by instructing religious personnel from
other orders to come to the aid of the Augustinians in the Philippines: in 1578, the
Franciscans arrived; in 1581, the first group of Jesuits; in 1587, the Dominicans;
and finally, in 1606, the Augustinian Recollects.20
To this chronology of religious mission establishment, however, an
important caveat should be mentioned concerning the Jesuits. Although they
arrived in the Philippines in 1581, a permanent Jesuit mission was not established
until 1590. That first Jesuit mission was an exploratory mission to assess the
practicality of establishing an active mission in the islands, “to be of assistance to
the Spaniards there, and after familiarizing themselves with the conditions in that
region, send back a report.”21 With the existence of Jesuit missions in nearby
Macau and Moluccas, the economics of maintaining three locations in the region
was a concern for the Society’s headquarters in Rome. Additionally, Jesuit
superiors maintained that an exploratory study was normal for possible new Jesuit
mission stations: “… these priests came to this land to see and consider the
opportunity that may present itself here, and to determine the merit of sending
missionaries, as is customary for us before establishing a permanent mission…”22
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Cólin, Labor Evangelica, 1:166 note 3. Cólin-Pastells wrote: “Gran necesidad en estas
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John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino
Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 32.
21
de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 5. (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa)
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However, if one were to look at Jesuit missionary activities globally, the
events in Spanish America may have also dictated this cautious approach from the
Jesuit order. The failure of the Jesuit mission in what is now Florida may have
influenced this Jesuit policy of gradual introduction. Indeed, there were Jesuit
successes in Goa, parts of Japan, and even Macau, but these were all with the
Portuguese or with the Italian. The Florida mission was their first partnership
with the Spanish. That mission quickly turned sour and eventually failed, for the
Jesuits witnessed firsthand how the Spaniards mistreated the natives of that land,
and the results that brought. In what was supposed to be an evangelizing mission,
hostilities and outright violence between the natives and the Spaniards became
commonplace, essentially endangering Jesuit missionary work. And the Jesuits
were quick to point out the reason: “Those missionaries with some experience in
La Florida quickly came to believe that the greatest impediment to their work was
not climate, Indians, or native priests, but their fellow Spaniards who antagonized
even friendly Indians for seemingly little reason.”23 As a result of this failed
Florida mission with Spain, the Jesuits were reluctant to work with the Spaniards.
The innate pride and haughtiness that the Spanish brought – Spanish hubris, a
mentality that led them to believe that regardless of their stations in the old
country they were all hidalgos, or noblemen, in the New World and the Indies –
to the missions were essentially condemning the evangelization process to fail
before it even started. Consequently, what followed in the Philippines was a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Apr. 1988): 140-145. (Translated
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decade-long feasibility study of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing
a permanent mission in the new Spanish colony, of working with the Spanish
once again, and perhaps, of putting stock in the belief that Spanish conquistadores
learned some lessons from their failed Florida mission.
This controlled and careful approach of the Jesuits demonstrated their
understanding of the importance, and their use of a strategic approach to their
missionary activities in the early modern period, a period marked by the struggle
between traditional Catholic doctrines and humanist ideals. Against the
background of exploration and colonization, these missionaries realized the
indispensability of a well-laid out plan and a calculated strategy to achieve their
goals, and of course, the importance of learning from past experiences, while
furthering a Christianization agenda. Indeed, their exercise of prudence in
establishing mission stations revealed an almost heretical acceptance that faith
alone does not suffice. If it did, they, like the other missionary orders, would
have blindly established their mission and proceeded to interact, communicate,
and convert the native inhabitants of the islands without regard to language,
culture and the many other factors that complicate the realities of the period.
The members of the Society of Jesus not only brought with them a fervent
conviction to spread Christianity throughout the globe, but they also brought with
them a praxis-oriented training that helped them in their missionary activities. If
they entered the Society as a young man, they were educated, conditioned, and
trained to be able to contribute to these apostolic endeavors. If they joined the
Society as adults, they were already lawyers, theologians, educators, soldiers, and
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mathematicians, among others. They were practical, just as much as they were
spiritual.24 “Their vocation was to a mixed life, a life of action as well as
contemplation, in which prayer, to use a phrase of Nadal’s (one of the first
Jesuits), ‘reached out to the external work.’”25
The first Jesuit mission to the Philippines consisted of four members:
Antonio Sedeño, Alonso Sánchez, both priests, Gaspar Suarez de Toledo, a
scholastic, and Nicolas Gallardo, a lay brother. However, nine days after the
group set out for their voyage across the Pacific, Suarez de Toledo was stricken
with a burning fever and died nine days later.26
We now turn to Alonso Sánchez (1547-1593). The following section
focuses on him and his indispensible contribution to the colonial process toward
the end of the sixteenth century.

Alonso Sánchez
In 1579, Alonso Sánchez arrived in Mexico as part of a group of talented
and capable Jesuit fathers from Spain. Even in that select company, Astráin, the
historian of the Spanish provinces of the Society of Jesus, described Sánchez as
standing “head and shoulders above them all by reason of his talent, and also by
reason of his peculiar personality.”27 He was of sound peasant stock who took to
athletics and singing popular ballads in his earlier years. In 1565, at the age of
twenty, he entered the Society in Alcalá as a novice. He completed his
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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theological studies with great distinction, and in 1571, was ordained to the
priesthood. It was during this time that Sánchez exhibited peculiarities in his
behavior. He began to extend his hours of prayer, and to withdraw from the
social activities of the Society. His predilection to solitude and dedication to
prayer earned him the nickname, “medio Cartujo” – almost a Carthusian.28 When
he was sent to Mexico, Sánchez’s superiors ordered him to abandon his life of
semi-retirement, and occupy himself with preaching and hearing confessions, and
other community outreach ministries. Claudio Acquaviva, the Society’s general,
once remarked: “any method of prayer which does not incline the soul to action
and the ministries of our vocation in the service of God and the salvation and
perfection of our fellow men may cause great harm to the institute of the Society
and should be looked upon as a delusion, inasmuch as it is outside of and alien to
the grace and purpose which God our Lord has given to the Society.”29 He
obeyed without protestation. Upon seeing his obedience and deference, his
superiors elevated him to rector of the college of San Gerónimo at Puebla. It was
here that Sánchez received his order to travel to the Philippines as part of the first
group of Jesuit missionaries. Before he left, however, his immediate superior,
Father Juan de la Plaza, expressed reasonable fears of Sánchez regressing back to
his hermetical life if an ocean was placed between them. Sánchez responded with
a written statement to Plaza, promising him that he would continue to exercise the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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community outreach ministries of the Society under penalty of being labeled as
not a real Jesuit.30
However, Sánchez, to his core, detested conventional missionary and
educational work. He strongly disliked ecclesiastical activities, opting instead to
participate in the world of secular politics. He wrote in 1583 that the Jesuits
should “engage in political work in favor of the king in order to win as much of
his esteem…”31 Sánchez further rationalized his predilection for politics by
explaining the benefits that a political alliance may bring to the Society. He saw
it as an exchange of favors: the Jesuits would assist in the Spanish monarchy’s
imperial ambitions, and in return, the Crown would grant the Jesuits royal rights
to the conversion of the subjugated people.32 Sánchez would soon enough find
the opportunity to exercise and demonstrate his political acumen, for he would be
sharing the long voyage from Mexico to the Philippines with the future
archbishop of Manila.
Sánchez sailed to the Philippines with a rather large contingent of
religious personnel, eighteen Augustinians, six Franciscans, and most importantly,
Domingo de Salazar, a Dominican, who had already received his orders to be the
first bishop of the Philippines. In that voyage, Sánchez apparently made a
favorable impression on Salazar, especially after the former delivered a sermon to
the passengers, so much so that even before the end of the journey, Salazar was
already consulting the Jesuit “on the quality and quantity of his prayer, his
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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penances, his diet and apparel, the conduct of his household, and the discharge of
duties as bishop.”33 This was the first demonstration of Sánchez’s extraordinary
gift as counselor and advisor, and at the same time, a presaging of the role he will
be playing in the colonial politics.
When they reached the Philippines, the islands already began to exhibit
early signs of Spanish colonial society: the seat of colonial government was along
Calle Real; not far from it, a humble parish church that would, in a few years, rise
to be a cathedral; Spanish noble ladies peeking out of their carriage windows;
Spanish civil guards, ambling through the dirt streets; peninsulares and insulares;
mestizos and mestizas; the principalia, the native ruling class; and the common
people, all carrying on with their businesses. With the Spanish colonial enterprise
seemingly chugging along in the islands, and the anticipated growth of the
Catholic community, Philip II gave the order to establish the Philippine diocese in
1581.34 Domingo de Salazar, who came with the first group of Jesuits from
Mexico, assumed the role of the first Bishop of Manila.35
The Philippines despite its exterior calm, posed complications that
authorities in Spain and Mexico were trying to understand and address: 1) the
Philippines’ distance from both Spain and Mexico presented challenges over its
effective administration; 2) the maintenance of the Philippines as a colony was a
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losing venture – despite its ‘entrepot’ status, the Philippines could only be
maintained by a monthly stipend, known as situado, from Mexico – in other
words, the money the Philippines generated as an ‘entrepot’ was less than the
amount needed for its maintenance and upkeep; 3) and because of the trade
facilitated by the galleons, Chinese silk was flooding the American market, and
undercutting in price the even inferior Spanish silk. Spanish merchants were
pushing for the abandonment of the colony to secure the place of Spanish goods
in the Americas.36
Further, even before the settlement, there was already the question of
legitimacy: Spain, it seemed, had a tenuous claim over the Philippine Islands. In
1529, the Treaty of Zaragoza was signed by Spain and Portugal. It aimed to
define the areas that fell under Spain or Portugal’s influence. But due to either
miscalculations or confusion over the exact location of the longitudinal line that
divided the world between the two Iberian kingdoms, the division was far from
clear and fixed. Both kingdoms could make a convincing argument over where
their “spheres of influence” ended, and where the other’s began. The Philippines,
located almost exactly half way around the globe from the Iberian Peninsula, fell
along this contested area. Eventually, modern scholars established the Philippines
falling under the Portuguese side. Spain, through political maneuvering, managed
to seize the islands under Portugal’s nose.37
Even as early as 1568, Legazpi reported to the king that trade cannot
sustain the islands. The following year, he declared to the viceroy of Mexico:
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“The Philippines ought to be considered of little importance, because at present
the only article of profit which we can get from them is cinnamon.”38 Apart from
the seeming scarcity of natural resources, the tropical climate made matters worse
for the Europeans. One Spaniard exclaimed that the climate in the Philippines
was simply “quatro meses de polvo, quatro meses de lodo, quatro meses de
todo.”39 (four months of dust, four months of mud, four months of both.) An
Italian Jesuit visiting the islands from Macau confided to a friend that, because of
the unbearable heat and humidity, “… this country is the most apt to make a man
a saint in a hurry.”40 Of course, hearing it Italian somewhat mitigated the gravity
of the situation – questa è celeste per farsi l’huomo presto santo.
With all the complications and challenges posed by the new colony, its
abandonment seemed inevitable. The arguments proffered by those advocating
for letting the Philippines go were all either economic or political, an appeal to the
practical sense of the Spanish Crown. However, sixteenth-century Spain was just
as much occupied with the spiritual, as much as it was with the practical. Philip
II, Spain’s reigning monarch, was just as much proud of being known as a
descendant of Isabel, the Catholic, as he was of extending the Spanish Empire.
The Philippines’ ecclesiastical community probably saw an opportunity to appeal
to the king and convince him of the importance of the islands as a religious
enterprise. To this end, Bishop Salazar convoked the Synod of Manila in 1581.41
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Sánchez found in this situation the perfect opportunity to abandon
missionary activities, which as mentioned earlier he loathed, and assume a more
prominent role in colonial society, as counselor to the bishop, representative of
the state, and broker between the metropolis and the colonial city. Sedeño,
Sánchez’s superior, was obviously not thrilled with news that one of this priests
would be taking on non-religious roles. However, based on what Sánchez
articulated in Mexico, and Sedeño’s realization that if not given this opportunity,
Sánchez would retreat to a life of hermetic existence, Sedeño agreed. Sánchez’s
made himself available to his “high-placed friends among the laity [who]… were
taken right to his room.”42 His counsel was sought after, and greatly valued by
the governor, and other citizens of note, but most especially by the bishop, on
diverse issues from justice and commerce to the welfare of the natives.43 Not
surprisingly then, Salazar, based on the favorable impression left on him by
Sánchez on their journey from Mexico, named the Jesuit to the council of the
Synod, serving, together with an Augustinian and a Franciscan, as theologian and
canonist. In addition to his official duties, Sánchez also became unofficial advisor
to Salazar. The elder bishop would confer with the Jesuit sometimes until late at
night on various problems besetting the colonial city.44
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Perhaps the most exigent of the concerns the Synod had to address was
Spain’s claim of sovereignty over the Philippines, for on it rests the issues of
legitimacy and rightful occupation; what title or titles does the king of Spain
possess to justify his claim over the islands? Despite the islands’ distance, hostile
climate, and the economic burden it imposed on the Spanish Crown, why did it
maintain the Philippines as a colony for more than three centuries? Did Spain
have legitimate claims to the Philippines to begin with?
The Augustinians were most dogmatic in their approach to conquest as
compared to the Jesuits. They saw the ultimate goal of the Spanish conquest as a
means of advancing Christianization. The pope had the divine right to preach the
gospel to all people and nations: “the principal if not the only reason for bringing
the Philippines under Spanish rule was in order that the Filipinos might be
converted to Christianity; and whatever [the Spaniards] might have to say for
themselves, [for] killing, beating, robbing, cheating, enslaving, and otherwise
mistreating the Filipinos did not promote their conversion.”45 The Spanish
monarch’s legitimate claim and the colonial government’s rightful occupation and
just administration were simply subordinate to the enterprise of evangelization.
The Franciscans, at that time, were still new to the colony. Having just
arrived in 1578, they were just settling in into their new home when the synod
was convoked.46 There was also very little, if any, documented Franciscan
participation in the sources I consulted.
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By virtue of elimination, the Crown’s rationale, as determined by the
synod, for legitimacy in its occupation of the islands, and its continued
colonization seemed to have a Jesuit provenance.

In what is perhaps the first

manifestation of political activity on the part of the Jesuits in the Philippines,
Sánchez came up with practical and enforceable reasons and justifications for
Spain’s presence in and continued occupation of the islands. Conveniently, he
started out with the fact that Spain was already in the Philippines.
In Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, of which a handwritten
manuscript is housed in the Hispanic Society of America, Sánchez memorialized
his thoughts, and positions on evangelical missions, and military excursions into
foreign lands. Under the section titled Razonamiento, he maintained that Spanish
presence in the Philippines was based on the needs of the four groups of people,
which composed the colony. First was the community of Spaniards already in the
islands. As loyal subjects of the king of Spain, this community had a presumptive
right to maintain themselves as such. The second community consisted of the
natives who already accepted Spanish rule and the Christian faith. The third were
the natives who were already conquered but yet to be converted. And the last
community consisted of those yet to be conquered and converted.47 Naturally, the
first reason placed the issue of legitimacy and sovereignty on center stage. To
this, Sánchez invoked the divine rights of the pope, which he wrote under a
different section called Memorial y Apuntamientos, as the infallible caretaker of
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the spiritual well-being of all people, to communicate to all people and nations
about the Catholic faith, and his right to remove anyone who impedes or
contradicts this divine mission.48
Sánchez then proceeded to present his case for the necessary use of
violence in conquest and evangelization. As if responding to Martin de Rada
himself, the influential Augustinian writer, and his objection to the use of military
force, Sánchez argued that troops were indispensible to create a suitable
environment for the conversion of the natives. Quoting de la Costa:
The divine mandate by which missionaries went forth to teach all
nations would be meaningless if it did not imply an obligation in
those to whom they are sent not to hinder them in the execution of
their mandate. If obliged, they could be compelled; by moral
compulsion, where practicable, but if not then by physical. This
was what justified a military escort for the missionary, and, in a
larger sense, a civil protectorate of the missions. Its purpose was
not to despoil the pagans of what was rightly theirs, whether they
be goods of the temporal order such as property, or of the spiritual
order, such as liberty. Far less was it to intimidate them and in that
sense to compel them to accept the faith. It was merely to
command their respect for the person and function of the
missionary – a respect which mere moral suasion was ordinarily
powerless to command in primitive or savage communities – and
thus create the conditions whereby the faith could be freely taught
and freely received.49
Neatly summing up his exposition, Sánchez marshaled his arguments in
his Memorial y Apuntamiento, and in his Razonamiento to weave a quite seamless
and convincing narrative that made the empirical realities of the Philippines very
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well suited for future evangelization. He wrote that the Spaniards in this city
were only few; the pacified and Christianized natives outnumbered them; and
still, the natives who are yet to be pacified and Christianized outnumbered them
all. For this reason, the king had the right and the responsibility to maintain able
and sufficient military personnel to establish peace and order for the sake of these
communities. What was most interesting, though, was that Sánchez went further
than just establishing the rationality for the maintenance and use of military force.
He elevated this heretofore tentative arrangement into an obligation of the king
himself.50
Curiously, though, Sánchez gave a fifth reason for the retention of the
Philippines as a colony, which de la Costa not quite inexplicably left out. The fifth
reason had to do with state security. Sánchez pointed out that there was a very
real threat of incursion from powerful foreign enemies already in the region. The
Japanese, the Chinese, and the English have all been spotted in the area, and did
possess motives to claim the islands. Sánchez reiterated that a strong and ready
army was necessary to meet these very real challenges head on. Spanish
authorities of the practical persuasion perhaps responded positively to this
argument. A fifth argument that appealed to the more temporal and pragmatic
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concerns of the empire would have been a welcome addition to the strictly four
religious-cum-missionary arguments.51
Although Sánchez’s Razonamiento could easily come across as overly
simplistic –indeed the four communities he mentioned were everyone in the
colony – his presentation revealed a good measure of understanding of court
politics. He framed the conquest and maintenance of the Philippines as a
religious endeavor, and appealed to Philip II’s idea of a Hispanic world:
The conquest of the Philippines was also the expression – perhaps
the fullest expression of Philip’s vision of how the Hispanic World
would develop under his kingship… It was a matter of deepest
regret to Philip that Charles V had refused to confer on him the
succession to the title of “Holy Roman Emperor,” for the title
carried with it the unquestioned secular leadership of Christendom.
As a mere king, Philip was only one among many monarchs in
Europe, although perhaps the most powerful. In the Indies, and
more especially in the Philippines, he reclaimed his heritage… It is
likely that in prioritizing the reconquest of the Philippines Philip
was also expressing his determination to be unequivocally the
leading ruler of his time – that although he was not Holy Roman
Emperor he would rule an empire that was truly worldwide.
Unlike Philip’s territories in the Indies, the Philippines was not
rich in gold and silver but their possessions allowed Philip to
extend Spanish power into Asia and to enhance and deepen his
own stature as the leading monarch of his day. On many levels,
therefore, the conquest of the Philippines held profound
importance to Philip, both as a monarch and as a man.52
Sánchez traveled to Madrid and presented his recommendations to Philip
II and a special commission just a few months after the great loss of the Spanish
armada to the British. Additionally, he emphasized the outside threat from other
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foreign powers that had their own agenda in claiming the islands for themselves.
Under this circumstance, Philip II would have embraced the opportunity to
redeem himself and his kingdom, and welcomed any distraction from that
embarrassing defeat.
Sánchez, as envoy or chargé d'affaires, made Philip II realize the
importance of keeping the Philippines a part of the Spanish empire. He presented
the struggling colony as an opportunity for the monarch to prove himself worthy
to be named “Holy Roman Emperor,” a title denied to him. Maintaining the
Philippines as a Spanish colony was the perfect vehicle for Philip to demonstrate
that he was a martyr for the faith despite the burden it imposed on the royal
treasury, despite the protestations of the Seville merchants for its abandonment,
despite its distance, and its lack of accessible natural resources. Philip was still
willing to support the islands as the personal cross he bore, to the detriment of his
wealth. By voluntarily burdening himself and his treasury with a losing venture
for the sake of his Catholic faith, Philip not only proved himself more than worthy
of the title denied to him, but also very deserving to be recognized as the rightful
heir of Ferdinand and Isabella, the first of the Catholic monarchs.
In the end, more than anything else, what Sánchez achieved was to
informally recast the Philippines as an evangelical enterprise, and not as a
colonial one. He did not argue against the economic and practical reasons for
abandoning the colony. For he very well knew that he could not dispel them.
Instead, he deemphasized them, and highlighted the religious, spiritual,
missionary duties of the empire. Obviously, he did an excellent job in convincing
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the Spanish crown to maintain the islands as a colony: colonists never again
seriously entertained thoughts of abandonment. As a result, Spain remained in the
Philippines for three hundred and thirty years, owing in no small part to Jesuit
argumentation and reasoning.

Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera
Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (d. 1660), the 22nd governor of the
Philippines, and the Society of Jesus had an unusual alliance. It was unspoken,
informal, and yet quite significant. The entire colony knew about it, and Corcuera
did not have any qualms in demonstrating his preference. Perhaps what drew
Corcuera to the Jesuits was the military origin and structure of the Society.
Himself a soldier, Corcuera was a “knight of the Order of Alcantara, and member
of the Council of War in the states of Flandes [sic], where he had served many
years with great credit, being one of the most renowned captains in the siege of
Breda. He had afterward been master-of-camp of the port of Callao in Peru, and
captain-general of the cavalry of that kingdom, and lastly governor of Panama.”53
He obviously had a military disposition and also the temperament that went with
it: he was rigid and austere, strong-willed, and quite stubborn in his judgments.54
Unsurprisingly, his administration was known to be the most tumultuous with
regard to state-church relationship. Outright hostility between the archbishop and
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the governor was common place, and in the ensuing confusion, fractures within
the ecclesiastical community began to emerge.
Throughout Corcuera’s administration, the Society of Jesuit positioned
itself strategically to take advantage of the precarious situation in the colony.
Whereas before, as demonstrated by Sánchez, the Society chose to take an active
and vocal role in the colonial enterprise; this time, however, the Jesuit fathers
chose to play a supporting role in the saga taking place in the colonial stage –
more of a passive role, true, but no less political than what they had played in the
past. As the state, represented by the governor, and the church, represented by the
archbishop, battled it out, the Jesuit fathers stood on the sidelines and waited for
the winner, to collect the spoils of the battle with him.
Before Corcuera set foot in the Philippines in 1635, he made a promise to
Fray Diego Collado, from the Order of the Preachers, who shared the voyage
from Mexico with him. Collado, although not in possession of any formal paper
work from Rome, sailed to the Philippines to divide the colony’s Dominican
province, and put himself as the superior of the newly formed part. This new
congregation, headed by Collado, would have been dedicated solely to the
conversion of China and Japan, using only the Philippines as a base. Corcuera
presented, and pushed for, this proposal to the local church authorities. Hernando
Guerrero, archbishop of Manila, and Fray Diego de Duarte, a local Dominican
bishop rejected it without reservation: the archbishop, because Collado lacked the
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necessary paper work from Rome and was just relying on the promise of the
governor, and de Duarte, because it was his province to be divided.55
The Society of Jesus may not have been involved in any way in this
narrative, but the outcome informed the strategy they applied during Corcuera’s
administration. Had the proposal been approved, the Jesuit superiors in Rome and
the Jesuit fathers in China would have harshly chastised their Philippine
counterparts for endangering the already precarious China mission.56 After all,
these regional mission fields were interconnected through the constant flows of
maritime trade and migration. But the Jesuit fathers in the Philippines seemed to
know that archbishop Guerrero would reject the proposal outright, for lack of
necessary documentation. Indeed, Guerrero’s appointment as archbishop was
very much delayed, for the authorities in Rome took their time in preparing the
paperwork, and sending it to the Philippines.57 With the proposal’s rejection by
almost all sections of the ecclesiastical community confirmed, Corcuera was left
dejected. It was his first clash against the church, and they handed him a
resounding defeat. The Jesuit fathers may have seen an opportunity in Corcuera’s
defeated state, but decided to wait a little longer before stepping in.
It did not take long before Corcuera saw an opportunity to even the score
with the church. The story of Francisco de Nava, which started out as a lovers’
dispute, eventually escalated into one of the most controversial state-church
conflicts, and more importantly, for this study, internal religious fragmentation in
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Spanish Philippines: Nava, a Spanish artilleryman, maintained an illicit
relationship with his native slave girl. Their affair scandalized the entire city, and
the archbishop of Manila, Fray Hernando Guerrero, had to order Nava to sell (or
send) the girl away. Stricken with grief of passion, Nava proposed to marry the
slave girl to legitimize their relationship. The girl refused, choosing to remain a
slave with her current owner, than to be his wife. Blinded by disbelief, his love
for her turned to madness. And seeing her on the street one day, he came up to
her and stabbed her to death. Nava fled the scene and took refuge in a nearby
convent.58
Corcuera demanded that Nava surrender to the civil guards, as he thought
that the right of sanctuary was not applicable in this case. For some reason,
Corcuera seemed to believe that Nava’s action amounted to treason and,
therefore, was not protected by the right of sanctuary. The Augustinians, in
whose convent Nava took refuge, did not agree with Corcuera and refused to give
up the artilleryman, a decision supported by the archbishop. Corcuera responded
by sending a detachment of soldiers to extricate Nava from the convent and
deliver him for trial. Nava was quickly sentenced to death by hanging, in a
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special gallows erected right in front of the Augustinian church where he initially
sought refuge.59
This whole affair divided the Spanish population in the Philippines, some
siding with the governor, and others with the archbishop. The religious orders,
particularly the Augustinians, were at the center of the controversy.
Unsurprisingly, they, the Augustinians, together with the Dominicans, and the
Franciscans sided with the archbishop. The Jesuits, however, did not. They
reached out to Guerrero to broker a peace, and to settle ancillary issues that arose
from this controversy. The archbishop rebuffed the Jesuits, and accused them of
siding with the governor (to which, de la Costa admitted: “Possibly, they did.”)60
This fragmentation within the church unsettled the ecclesiastical
community, especially the archbishop, who, in his wisdom, summoned all the
superiors of the religious orders to decide whether the governor overreached in his
authority as royal patron of the colony. All the orders’ superiors attended, except
the Jesuit superior, Luis de Pedraza, who in his absence sent a letter:
Very illustrious Lord: It seems that the more the Society tries to be
of service to your illustrious Lordship and your vicar general by
promoting peace in the commonwealth and harmonious relations
between its ecclesiastical and civil heads, so much the more do
certain parties (I do not know whether with the same good
intention) persist in misinterpreting our efforts, extracting, as the
saying goes, poison from the antidote. I therefore fail to see what
useful purpose will be served by our attendance, or what difference
it will make if our views are not heard; for whatever may be said is
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bound to be received in the same spirit as our recent wellintentioned attempts at mediation.61
This response from Pedraza was very much at odds with the spirit of the
Society, whose emphasis on obedience was integral in the formation and training
of its members. Surely, there would have been no harm if Pedraza attended the
meeting. The worst possible thing that could have had happened was to be
rebuffed once again. And even more so, if the Jesuits were truly sincere in their
efforts to keep the peace, Pedraza would have attended the meeting, if only to
soothe Guerrero’s hurt feelings of being betrayed by them. Instead, Pedraza
chose to excuse himself, and the Society, from the meeting, demonstrating a clear
signal to Corcuera that they were on his side.
Pedraza’s decision was really a stroke of genius: a remarkable
demonstration of his understanding of colonial politics and the benefits of what a
sound political strategy could bring. He managed to deliver two important
achievements for the Society: 1) realizing that Corcuera, through his sheer
stubbornness and strength of will may once again attempt to send missionaries to
China and Japan, he may very well have used this incident as leverage to dissuade
him from doing so, or at least to keep him in check; 2) and without personally
reaching out to Corcuera, yet still expressing loyalty to him, Pedraza essentially
avoided accusations of ingratiating the Society with Corcuera and his
administration.
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Rejection of the archbishop’s invitation did not come without harsh
repercussions. The archbishop responded with a vengeance that placed the
Society’s missionary activities in jeopardy. Guerrero prohibited the Jesuits from
preaching throughout the archbishopric, thus confining them within their churches
and convents; he stripped them of the title of synodal examiners, a position of
counsel for ecclesiastical matters; and he forbade interaction between them and
the rest of the religious community – all under penalty of excommunication.62
The Jesuits, understandably angered by the archbishop’s excessive
penalties, appealed to Corcuera and his advisors. Here, Pedraza’s gamble paid
off. For the governor stood by the Jesuits all the way (and the way was quite
extended and circuitous), culminating in the archbishop’s dramatic forced
removal from office – or rather, the archbishop’s throne, where he was found
clothed in full pontificals, complete with the blessed host in a pyx for his
protection – and eventually, his banishment from the city.63
With the archbishop’s departure, Jesuit privileges were reinstated. But a
new sense of order now fully emerged: it was the administration of Corcuera, with
his Jesuit advisors on his side. The other orders knew too well that their actions
were restricted so long as Corcuera was in office; and that it would serve them
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well to fly under the radar until Corcuera was replaced, which happened shortly
thereafter. As for Guerrero, he did come back to Manila, and to this post, but not
without concessions. He was a changed man upon his return – a bit more
submissive, sometimes even deferential. Perhaps a personal letter from Philip IV,
the reigning Spanish monarch, tempered his character. In it, the king strongly
reprimanded Guerrero for his blatant disrespect of his royal patronage, and for his
careless execution of his ecclesiastical duties. The king made plain that his letter
was a clear warning for Guerrero, that if he did not act and behave in a manner
benefiting the Crown, “and that if this admonition was not enough, I would bring
the issue to His Holiness to bring about good government and welfare for the
colony.”64
The letter from Philip IV to Guerrero was such a stinging rebuke for
anyone not to have taken it seriously. It was a clear demonstration of how much
the king valued the cooperation and harmonious relationship of his civil and
religious personnel throughout his empire.
Meanwhile, Corcuera showered the Jesuits with prized appropriations,
most notable were: 1) the entrustment to the Jesuits of the island of Mindanao for
missionary and pastoral work;65 2) and the endowment of a royal college under
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the order, named the College of San Felipe de Asturias.66 The island of Mindanao
is the largest in the archipelago, thus giving the order more than enough room to
grow and expand their operations. The endowment of a royal college under the
order’s charge, meanwhile, helped establish the order as the leading educators, a
role to which they aspire in all their mission stations, in the colony. These two
grants alone were enough to sustain the Jesuits in many ways – generate income
to support their Philippine province, keep their members occupied with
missionary activities, and maintain, even further, their influence throughout the
islands.
The island of Mindanao, located in the southern part of the archipelago,
has always been a coveted missionary area for the religious in the Philippines.
Even in 1591, then Governor Dasmariñas realized the immense potential in that
island:
… the island of Mindanao is so fertile and well-inhabited, and
teeming with Indian settlements, wherein to plant the faith, and of
so great circumference – namely, three hundred leagues – and
distant two hundred leagues from this island of Luzon; and is rich
in gold mines and placers, and in wax, cinnamon, and other
valuable drugs. And although the said island has been seen,
discussed, and explored (and even in great part given in
repartimiento), no effort has been made to enter and reduce it, nor
has it been pacified or furnished with instruction or justice – quite
to the contrary being, at the present time, hostile and refusing
obedience to his Majesty; and no tribute, or very little, is being
collected.67
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Mindanao, then, was virtually unsullied, pristine, and raw. The appeal of
this heretofore virgin island was understandably irresistible for the Jesuit
missionaries who were latecomers in the colony. Preceded by the Augustinians
and Franciscans (and the Dominicans, if one were to consider the formal
establishment of the orders), the Jesuits did not experience the early cross-cultural
collision between East and West as other religious orders had encountered.
Corcuera offered this singular opportunity to the Jesuit fathers, to experience what
the other orders before them had experienced. This, perhaps, after Sánchez’s
successful persuasions to remain in the colony, was the Philippine Jesuits’
greatest achievement.
Besides the obvious opportunities that the island presented – abundance in
land, livestock, and vegetation – for both religious and secular activities,
Mindanao posed a unique challenge to the order. Being close to Indonesia and
Borneo, Mindanao was home to a large Muslim population who maintained
friendly relations with their Islamic neighbors.68 For the Jesuits, this was their
very own version of the Reconquista (a historical event that preceded their
founding), a holy war, which appealed to the soldier in them. The order set
themselves up in the northern part of the island with some military troops from
the civil government. There were a few clashes between the Catholic Spaniards
and the Muslim natives, but the advantage never seemed to remain on one side. A
loss in one battle was followed by a victory in the next for both camps. In the
end, although the Jesuits were never really able to Christianize the entire island of
Mindanao, the order was able to contain Islam to the southern part of the colony
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and maintain a sizable Christian population in the northern part of the island, quite
an admirable feat given the internal division in the Spanish colonial
administration and the support the Muslims in Mindanao received from other
Muslims in the region.69
Pedraza’s strategy benefited the Society during Corcuera’s administration.
The Jesuit father perhaps understood that soldiers did not respond very well to
strong-arming, and that the way to elicit a positive response from Corcuera was to
demonstrate that the execution of the responsibilities of the governor’s office is of
utmost importance. This was exactly what Pedraza did. In letting Corcuera carry
out the duties of his office, Pedraza supported Corcuera’s actions, and in refusing
to conspire against Corcuera, Pedraza validated them. Corcuera’s trust in the
Jesuit was implicit and indubitable, and he expressed this in a letter to Philip IV:
The Society of Jesus serves his Majesty with much love without
complaints; whatever is asked of them in his royal name. Not only
as chaplains for the galleons for the wars, but also for the wars and
whatever else is entrusted to them. They do not complain when
their stipends are reduced. They are good vassals, through good or
mistreatments. They do not accept novices from these islands, for
those worthy are very few, and they easily reject those who do not
follow the righteous path. For this reason, your Majesty’s
governor’s conscience is discharged from the need to be informed
or to inquire of the quality of their members for royal service, for
the order’s superior has adequately vetted them, and knows to
replace them if need be. This is not the case for the others [other
orders]. I therefore beseech your Majesty, with all humility and
reverence, to furnish these islands with more members from this
order from Spain, and fewer from the other orders. Your Majesty
will be well served, as also will God. I assure your Majesty, as a
good vassal, that I make this known to you without prejudice, but
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the belief that I am discharging the responsibilities of my
conscience.70
At the end of a governor’s term, a residencia took place. A residencia is a
quasi-tribunal, composed of the incoming governor and other Spanish officials
that assessed the present state of affairs of the colony, and evaluated the actions of
the outgoing governor during his term.71
In 1644, Don Diego Fajardo arrived in the Philippines, succeeding
Corcuera as governor.72 One of his first act as the new governor was to oversee
the residencia of his predecessor. Corcuera’s past conflicts with church officials,
and his unbridled demonstration of favoritism for the Jesuits did not help in this
inquest. Perhaps the people whom he had slighted, offended, and neglected saw
an opportunity to even the score. Found guilty of misappropriation of funds,
abandonment of governmental responsibilities, and receiving the blame for the
loss of Spanish Formosa, Corcuera was ordered to pay a hefty fine, and was sent
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to prison for five years.73 Never had the colony seen as much detestation directed
toward a governor: all his property confiscated, guards placed outside his cell, and
abandoned by everyone in his circle, Corcuera was left without money, without
friends, and almost without recourse.74
Curiously, throughout the whole proceedings, like it was at the beginning
of his term, the Jesuits, which Corcuera favored so much, were silent once again –
perhaps waiting on the sidelines to see how the pieces of the old governor’s
crumbling administration would fall.

Expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines
Indeed, the topic on the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines is
one of the most challenging to revisit and analyze in the nation’s history. Not
only are the records scant and scattered over different archives, but scholars in the
field are also in dispute over some crucial details that led to, and that happened
during, the actual expulsion. Further, at least one of these respected scholars
questions the veracity of a decisive primary source, which, when proven, could
render the research done on the subject thus far essentially inaccurate.75

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73!BR,

Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636,

192.!
74!Murillo

Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús,
136. Murillo Velarde wrote: “Creciò tanto el odio, que se hizo un exemplar nunca visto en estas
Islas con otro Governador, pues le prendieron, le embargaron sus bienes, le pusieron una
compañia de guardia en la fuerza de Santiago, y le apartaron, y le desterraron a sus criados,
amigos, y confidentes. Y hallandose sin dinero, sin tener de quien fiarse, sin testigos, y sin
Letrado, acudiò como indefenso, apelando al Real Consejo de las Indias, donde esperaba, le
oyesen con benignidad, y Iusticia…”
75
Jose Montero y Vidal and Nicholas Cushner have sparred over the expulsion of the
Jesuits in their respective works, which will be referenced and cited in this section.

!

40!

More complications arise from the fact that the expulsion of the Jesuits did
not only happen in the Philippines, nor exclusively in the Spanish dominions;
rather, it was a concerted move of the Catholic monarchs of Europe to expel the
Jesuits from their dominions because of the perceived threat that the Jesuits might
pose to their power and influence. Additionally, the expulsion decree came
immediately after the Seven Years’ War between Spain-France and Great Britain
(1756-1763), the proceedings of which greatly informed the general narrative of
the expulsion of the order.
It was, therefore, surprising to see how limited, and cursory, Horacio de la
Costa’s treatment on the topic was. In The Jesuits in the Philippines, de la Costa
briefly discussed how the members of his orders obeyed without protestation the
royal edict; how they fell in line, packed up their belongings, and wrapped up
their missionary work in the Philippines. For reasons known only to him, he did
not, not even in passing, mention the origin or the reasons for the king’s royal
decree, a very conspicuous oversight on de la Costa’s part, for the other chapters
in his book went to great lengths in expounding events of tangential relevance to
the primary subject matter. His chapter on the expulsion of the Jesuits was one of
the shortest, if not the shortest. Further, whether ironically or sarcastically, he
titled this chapter, “The King’s Good Servants” – an obvious commentary on
regalism, a concept which we shall discuss soon enough, and its anti-church
ideals. In either case, his bitterness was palpable.76
Still, I shall attempt to present a coherent and, if not complete, at least a
discernible picture of the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines. Although
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focusing on the Philippine experience, I shall begin by providing a brief account
of the antecedents to the expulsion of the order, namely: the political and religious
climate in Europe; and a short discussion of the Seven Years’ War that eventually
led to the British occupation of the city of Manila in 1762.

Regalism
By the time Charles III gave the order to expel the Jesuit fathers from his
dominions, anti-Jesuit sentiments and expressions had already been firmly
established and demonstrated in the kingdoms of France and Portugal. The
members were already expelled from the Kingdom of Portugal in 1759, and from
the Kingdom of France in 1764.77 At the heart of the matter, it seemed, was
regalism78 – that modern European idea that an absolute monarch, guided by the
ideals of the Enlightenment, may rule with little or no counsel from the church.79
This idea gradually undermined the political importance of the Church in
monarchial rule. Isabel and Ferdinand demonstrated the first signs of regalism
during their reign. The Spanish royal couple began to reclaim civil
responsibilities and privileges that the church, at the height of its power in the
Middle Ages, had appropriated for itself.80 This measured and careful growth of
royal power and influence continued through the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries and became fully realized in the eighteenth century when Enlightenment
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thought was sweeping throughout Europe, a fitting age for championing
individualism, modernity, and reason, and most relevant of all the, loosening of
the centuries-old grip of Rome on the crown and society. Naturally, the
institution that stood to lose the most was the church; and the organization within
the church that stood to be most negatively affected by this development was the
Society of Jesus, as demonstrated by the previous discussions was the most
political and the most likely among religious organizations to be embroiled in
non-religious matters. Unsurprisingly, the Jesuits guarded themselves against this
threat, and preached against its growing influence.81
However, even the powerful Jesuit fathers could not stop the inevitable.
Riots in Madrid involving the Jesuits made the situation worse, and Spanish court
officials already hostile to the order succeeded in convincing Charles III to follow
the lead of France and Portugal in expelling the Jesuits from his empire. On
February 27, 1767, the king issued his special royal decree, also known as the
Pragmatic Sanction. His reason for issuing the decree was oblique: “for great,
exigent, just, and necessary causes that I reserved solely to my royal person.”82
But the text of which was quite the opposite. It was clear and unhesitating:
I have come to order the expulsion, from all my domains of Spain
and the Indies, and the Philippine Islands, and all else that may fall
under my rule, of the members of the Society of Jesus, as well as
religious such as coadjutors or lay brothers who had already
undergone their initial profession, and the novices who would like
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to follow them, and all secular activities of the Society that they
perform in my domains.83
It took the entire following month of March to plan out the execution of
the decree. In early April, officials dispatched copies of the king’s order
throughout Spain, the Americas, the Philippines. In Spain, the expulsion of the
Jesuit fathers was swift and with vey few complications: “… the Jesuit expulsion
was being carried out with total efficacy as is appropriate, and with the
uneventfulness that one could hope for. The officials from both sides have been
complying to the word of the law, and it was very rare for a town to experience
disruption.”84 In the colonies, however, matters were more complicated. In the
Philippines, in particular, although the expulsion went relatively smoothly, the
event, and the circumstances surrounding it, revealed Jesuit political
machinations of a different kind.

Seven Years’ War
In the years 1756-1763, Europe was in the midst of the Seven Years’ War
between the allied forces of Spain and France, on one side, and Great Britain, on
the other. Rooted in acquiring the most colonies, and cornering the largest market
share in global trade, these nations not only waged war in Europe, but also in their
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territories throughout the world.85 This war had more lasting effects than some of
the previous wars before it that dragged on for a longer period of time. Within
less than a decade, alliances in Europe drastically changed, and the map of the
continent was essentially redrawn. The casualties were countless, and still, in the
end, a definitive victor was difficult to identify; although it seemed Great Britain
benefited the most when a peace accord was reached. The consequences of this
war caused more than mere ripples across oceans as they reached the colonies.
Sleepy colonial cities, usually unaware of the developments in Europe, were
shocked to wake up to the presence of new colonizers, bringing with them an
abrupt and swift change in government affairs and colonial administration.
The war in Europe had a far-reaching impact on the Philippines in 1762:
“Placing too great a confidence in their distance from Europe, the city of Manila
was more puzzled than alarmed on the morning of September 22, 1762, when an
armada of thirteen English vessels appeared in the Manila Bay anchorage. The
Seven Years War was on between France-Spain and England, but the colony was
blissfully unaware that Spain had been dragged into hostilities by the French in
1761.”86 The English commanders, Samuel Cornish and William Draper,
immediately demanded surrender from the city. Spanish city officials responded,
“… to the effect that the vassals of Charles III were prepared to lay down their
lives in defense of their religion and honor, [and with that] the bombardment of
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Manila began.”87 The Spaniards returned fire, and soon after, the British realized
how “woefully unprepared the city was for war.”88 On October 4, a senior
Spanish official, Simón de Anda y Salazar, left Manila to enlist more Spanish and
Filipino soldiers from the provinces, and continue to resist the British from
outside the city. As we shall see later, this would prove to be a crucial detail to
our narrative. Within two weeks, Manila fell to its knees. The British army
disembarked from their ships; the British commanders demanded four million
pesos, and the fulfillment of certain conditions to spare the city from sacking. But
apparently, even as late as the eighteenth century, the natural next step for the
victor was a celebratory plundering of the conquered land. Four thousand British
soldiers and two thousands sepoys, South Indians in the military service of the
British crown, spent forty hours pillaging Manila. From house to house, church to
church, nothing was left untouched. One could only surmise what they
discovered and took with them, for at that time, the faithful spared no expense in
adorning the churches with gold, silver, and precious stones. Despite the
pillaging, the British commanders still insisted on the payment of four million
pesos. Only in this instance, it was in exchange for the freedom of the city.
Manila archbishop, Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra began collecting the
four million pesos ransom money. But Anda, the Spanish official holding out
beyond the city limits with his army of Spanish and Filipino soldiers, refused to
accept the terms of surrender.89 Instead, he sent an impassioned plea to Rojo for
aid and additional supplies to supplement his war fund and the ammunitions that
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he collected for his planned retaliation on the British forces. He underscored the
great influence wielded by the curas (parish priests) on the natives, and how this
influence could be used to preserve loyalty to Spain.90 Almost all of the colony’s
religious and non-religious communities voluntarily complied, and provided
financial aid and actual soldiers to Anda’s request, seeing it as an act of patriotic
duty.
The Jesuits, however, were more welcoming and accommodating to the
British forces. They refused to participate, opting instead to establish and
maintain harmonious relationships with the invading power. Also, even while
negotiations were still underway and the Spanish colonial administration was still
very much in charge of the Philippines, the Jesuits already took down the Spanish
flag, and hoisted the British flag in its stead. This significant fact in the narrative
further proved how the Jesuits were comfortable existing in that middle-ground
between structural limitation and institutional agency. Waving the British flag not
only meant surrender to the invading British army, as some might interpret it to
be, it was also a signal of a receptiveness to communicate, a recognition of a very
realistic change, and more importantly, a willingness to be part of whatever
political and social order that was imminent. Not surprisingly, historian Montero
y Vidal labeled them as traitors and accused them of sharing a common cause
with the enemy, underscoring their failure to follow the laws of honor, loyalty and
patriotism.91
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Further, during the British occupation of the Manila, Spanish civil and
religious officials suspected the Jesuits of carrying on treasonous relationships
with the British. Indeed, in “The Summary of Excesses of the Jesuits Sent to
Rome for the Pope,” officials cited this illicit communications as one of the
reasons why the Society was expelled from the colony.92 The allegation singled
out Bernardo Pazuengos, the Jesuits Provincial during the British occupation and
at the time of the expulsion. He had indeed acted as an intermediary, a broker in
the truest sense of the word, between Draper and Anda, as the two were trying to
reach a settlement. A very unusual aspect of this negotiation proceedings was the
refusal of the British to commit anything at all into writing. This caused Anda to
be highly suspicious of the British and Pazuengos and their true intentions.93 And
rightfully so. Out of all the demands of the British, outrageous some of them
might be, this refusal to put into writing the settlement agreement was perhaps the
biggest obstacle of the negotiation proceedings between the two parties, and it
was equally unthinkable for the Jesuits to agree to negotiate a verbal contract,
given their meticulous recordkeeping tradition and penchant for histories, unless
something were to be gained.
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común con el enemigo, facilitando su triunfo; y esa excepción lamentable la ofrecieron los
jesuitas, en cuya casa-colegio arbolaron la bandera inglesa, pasándose inicuamente al bando bando
de los enemigos de la patria, y manteniendo después con ellos la major ammonia y tratos ilícitos,
reprobados por las leyes del honor, de la lealtad y del patriotismo.”
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However speculative, it seems that the Jesuits did have something to gain
from forging an alliance with the British, and not having any paper trail of their
communications. Perhaps recalling the pillaging of Manila at the beginning of the
British occupation, the Jesuits likely wagered that a friendly relationship with the
British would preserve their churches, which were the most adorned of all the
religious orders:
At a fiesta held in the Jesuits church n Manila, in 1623, the statues
of canonized Jesuits were placed at the altar. Their garments were
richly embroidered with gold and silver thread in intricate designs,
and were all covered with jewels – diamonds, pearls, rubies,
emeralds, seed-pearls, and other precious stones – arranged in such
a manner that their luster and varied colors gave them a most
pleasing and beautiful appearance. On the image of St. Xavier
were faithfully counted more than 15,000 precious stones and
pearls, among them more than a thousand diamonds. On that of St.
Ignatius there were more than 20,000 jewels, and of these over 800
were diamonds.94
Recovering even half of this Jesuit wealth would mean placing the Jesuit order
way ahead of its rivals, who lost nearly everything. They would have been both,
well-connected and well-funded. Jesuits’ posturing would have made them
uncontested in matters of religious, even non-religious, policies in the colony.
Indeed, the Jesuits had already used this particular political strategy in the
past, and it would serve them well in the future. As we shall see, similarities
could be drawn between their actions during this event and those of the post-war
period – their slow but clear support for the victors within shifting alliances had
contributed to the success of the order in the Philippines, and the Jesuits hoped
that these same moves would once again for them. They were essentially banking
on history repeating itself.
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The British occupation of Manila met an anti-climactic end. While the
negotiations between Spain and Britain were still happening, the signing of the
Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763 essentially ended the Seven Years’ War.
Rumor flew fast that the British already received their orders to evacuate the city,
and Anda was quick to recognize the opportunity in this development. He stalled
in his negotiations. The continued posturing of the British general and his local
intermediary (which happened to be the Jesuit Bernardo Pazuengos) lasted for
more than a year. Eventually, in March of 1764, the British fleet raised anchor
and sailed for India; Anda then marched triumphantly back into the city.

Expulsion
Throughout the centuries, the Society of Jesus had exercised its extraecclesiastical activities – in varying capacities, to varying degrees, and with
varying results. Inevitably, the Jesuit fathers’ participation in court affairs led to
disagreements and clashes with the non-religious members of royal courts in
Europe, which eventually grew to intense resentment against the order:
The hatred of ministers, favourites, mistresses, and intriguers
against the Jesuits had by this time grown powerful in all Catholic
courts, for the holders of these positions, in which, before the days
of Jesuit court confessors, it had been possible to exercise
unlimited control over the sovereigns, saw their positions more and
more seriously endangered by the influence of the fathers. It was
inevitable that people in every country who were being adversely
affected by the Jesuits should stretch out their hands to one
another, over the frontiers, and should unite in a firm league
against the order.95
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Under the guise of regalism and against the backdrop of the Enlightenment, these
high court officials rejected religious interference in state affairs and, through the
suppression of the order, successfully extirpated Jesuit elements from governing
councils.
Charles III’s Pragmatic Sanction, mentioned earlier, reached Manila on
May 17, 1768. It came by way of Acapulco through the viceroy of Mexico.
Addressed to Governor Jose Raón from the Conde of Aranda in Madrid, it
contained the text of the king’s decree, and instructions on how to proceed with
the order.96 The execution of the order was allegedly swift and efficient, and
followed the Conde’s instruction to the letter. From the account provided by Fr.
Francisco Puig, whose diary provided a first-hand narrative on how the order had
received the news and how the Jesuit fathers had responded to the decree, it
seemed the whole affair went without incident: On May 19, 1768, Puig wrote that
at nine-fifteen in the morning, the college of San Ignacio in Manila was occupied
by two companies of soldiers who stationed themselves in the inner part of the
college. The commanders of the troops ordered for the doors of the church to be
locked from the outside, and confiscated all keys and guarded all the exits. That
same morning, Don Manuel Galvan, a Spanish court official of the Real
Audiencia (Appelate Court) of Manila and entrusted appointed judge of the
governor arrived at the college of San Ildefonso, with other Spanish officials to
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serve as witness to the announcement of the royal decree.97 At this point, Puig
couldn’t have relayed it better himself:
As these were all present and the whole community gathered
together in obedience at the sound of the bell, he informed and
imposed upon us the royal decree of banishment with the
occupation of all of our property, as well as the other royal
dispositions about our exile contained in the Pragmatic Sanction.
All of these were read as well as the decree of the king in which
His Majesty authorized the Conde de Aranda to be in charge of the
execution of the expulsion of all Jesuits from the kingdoms and
domains of the king. The said royal ordinance was solemnly
announced in all the streets and posted in the usual public places of
the city, the governor adding a decree which ordered under pain of
grave penalties that anyone who held or knew anyone who held
Jesuit property or who owed anything to them was to present
himself to the authorities within two or three days to make such
information known. And the Archbishop… published an edict in
which he ordered that all his subjects under pain of major
excommunication late sententiae should punctually obey the said
decree of the governor. After hearing the royal disposition with
due reverence Fr. Provincial with the whole community obeyed
with all submission, bowing their heads to the sublime and
inscrutable designs of God.98
The events following the announcement of the royal decree and its
execution seemed to have gone, as mentioned earlier, without incident. By
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decreto del Rey con que Su Magestad autorizaba al Conde de Aranda para la execución del
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inescrutables consejos de Dios.
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August 1, 1768, the first batch of Jesuit fathers set sail for Mexico, then overland
to Havana, and from its port, crossing the Atlantic to their final destination in
Italy.99
However, this seamless, uneventful narrative of the expulsion of the
Jesuits from the Philippines is highly suspect. Normally, the Jesuits would have
expressed some sort of disapproval, or intention to appeal, or outright
disobedience, much like what transpired in Mexico.100 Therefore, the disquieting
uneventfulness by which the expulsion took place invites a closer look at the
actual event and the circumstances surrounding it.
The most compelling reason why the Jesuits acquiesced to the expulsion
decree was that they received advance warning from the colonial government,
enabling them to put their affairs in order. Indeed, if they could not fight the
expulsion order, then the next best thing was to be well-prepared for it.
Allegedly, the Jesuit fathers were able to burn incriminating documents, put away
their wealth for safekeeping, and arrange for a very comfortable and smooth
journey back to Europe. All this was made possible by a network of Jesuit
operatives in place in colonial Manila, a group of people who, although not
members of the order in the strictest sense, maintained allegiance to the Jesuits
through membership to lay organizations affiliated with or sponsored by the
Society.
The idea of lay people affiliated with a religious order started in thirteenthcentury Europe. Given the supremacy of the Catholic Church at that time, it was
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no surprise that the laity would want to be more involved in the activities of the
Church. Identifying with a particular order and its particular religious tradition
provided lay people a deeper and more meaningful connection with their faith,
and thus, the Catholic Church. This was achieved without completely divesting
themselves of their secular lives and pursuits.101 Thus, a formal means for the
laity to lead a more religious life was established through the formation of 3rd
order (the 1st and 2nd orders being the regular priests and the nuns, respectively)
brotherhoods or lay organizations. These lay organizations functioned as a
secular arm, enabling the orders to attract people who could not fully commit to
their religious vows: the vows of chastity and poverty were understandably
difficult to keep, and obedience was a close second. But loyalty, which was not a
religious vow, could be solicited. And for the Jesuits, with their emphasis on
education, eliciting and nurturing loyalty from people should come quite
naturally.102
The members of these organizations carried on with their ‘regular’ lives,
but they also clearly followed a particular form of religious devotion, depending
on the religious order to which they are affiliated. They were, in essence, hybrids
– part religious, part laity – who were just as comfortable in convents and
churches, as they were in the governor’s mansion or any non-religious
environment. The Jesuits saw this as an opportunity to legitimately extend their
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influence further into non-religious affairs. By placing their brothers into
positions of power or actively courting people in these positions, the Jesuits were
essentially growing a large network, beyond the confines of their convents and
churches, that could grant favors to the order and be called in its service in times
of need. The following paragraphs are devoted into exploring the validity of the
idea of a Jesuit network that protected the order and its members from the full
impact of the expulsion decree.
When the governor of the Philippines, Jose Raón, received the special
royal decree of Charles III regarding the expulsion of the Jesuits, he allegedly sold
the contents of the message to the Jesuits for a huge amount of money: “Raón, an
extraordinarily venal man, who had little scruple over enriching himself, saw in
this instance an opportunity to exploit the situation by revealing to the Jesuits the
secret of their expulsion in exchange for a substantial amount of money.”103
Owing to this covert deal, not only were the Jesuits able to keep jewelries and
precious objects that could easily be transported, but they were also able to
safeguard documents that were potentially incriminating and damaging to their
order.104 Following this illicit exchange, Raón supposedly had his secretary Juan
Antonio de Cosío draft a response to the Conde de Aranda of his faithful and
expedient execution of the Charles III’s royal decree, which he dated July 1768.
This document carries on its shoulder the entire Jesuit argument “that the
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governor had duly executed the royal commands regarding the Jesuits, in
accordance with his [Charles III’s] instructions; and this was sent to [the Conde
of] Aranda, with a letter in which he threw the blame upon Galvan [a Spanish
court official in the Philippines] for any defects which might be found in the
conduct of the expulsion.”105 Montero y Vidal questions the veracity of this
document, not as a forgery, but as a blatant false statement of Raón addressed to
the Conde of Aranda to cover his wrongdoing.106
In as much as Raón was the most venal man in the colony, he was not the
only corruptible one. Surrounding him were some members of the appellate
court, also functioning as a quasi-advisory council for the governor, whose moral
wherewithal could not stand the weakest of breezes. They were Juan Antonio
Cosio, Francisco Henriquez de Villacorta and Domingo Blas de Basaraz. Cosio
was a fiscal and the governor’s personal secretary; Villacorta was the court’s
auditor; while Basaraz was a court judge. As cited earlier, Raón did not
experience a crisis of conscience in amassing wealth through whatever means
possible. And together with Cosio, who was “more subtle and malevolent than
can be expressed,”107 Manila was left in the same decrepit state in 1768, as it was
in 1763, when the British left for India.108 These two men maintained no
allegiance to anyone, and masterfully pitted various organizations in colonial
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society against each other, as a form of distraction from their illicit activities.109
Villacorta and Basaraz, however, maintained relations outside of that little circle.
Villacorta was a recognized friend of the Society of Jesus. Besides having
taken the side of the Jesuits regarding disputes against the state or the church in
the past, he censured the archbishop for the latter’s insistence on episcopal
visitation, which meant interference in the way the Jesuits and other regular
orders run their parishes.110 Basaraz, one of the resident magistrates, was more
than a mere friend to the order. He was a Jesuit brother as he was a member of
that order’s lay organization.111 (The name of the lay organization was not
mentioned in any of the sources I consulted but all identify Basaraz as a 3rd order
Jesuit brother.)
Thus, given Basaraz’s close relationship with the Jesuit fathers, he was the
most likely person to have facilitated the covert transaction between the governor
and the Jesuits. Establishing who made the first move, however, whether it was
the governor looking to make an unexpected profit or the Jesuits sensing an
impending disaster for their order based on transoceanic whispers, is difficult to
determine. It could have also been Basaraz himself who initiated the exchange,
recognizing a mutually beneficial outcome for both the governor and the Jesuits.
Indeterminacy notwithstanding, the transaction proved how effective the Jesuit
political network was in an early modern colonial setting.
Basaraz’s demonstration of loyalty to the Jesuits did not stop there.
Allegations of his interference in the process of expulsion immediately surfaced
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after the last Jesuit priest left the colony. Among them were: Basaraz allowed the
Jesuits to take papers and books from their archives which had already been
seized; proceedings of the expulsion, to the extent to which he had oversight,
went according to the preference of the order; he clandestinely met with members
of the order; and he permitted them to take money and documents with them on
their trip to Mexico.112
Indisputably, Basaraz’s actions softened the harsh decree of expulsion
issued by Charles III. He was part of a larger Jesuit political machinery that the
order carefully established through the years to buttress, if not shield, them from
the attacks that would have inevitably come as the Society expanded in power and
influence. It could have very well been an Augustinian or Franciscan or any of
the other orders occupying the seat of magistrate judge in Raón’s advisory
council. But it was a Jesuit, and that was not happenstance. Basaraz was part of a
quasi-sleeper cell, to use modern parlance, whose tentacles extended far, wide and
deep. No doubt, the many organizations and institutions the Society established
and founded – the colleges, the charities, lay organizations – form part of this
complex Jesuit network, acting as the order’s eyes, ears, and sometimes even
muscle.
Simon de Anda y Salazar, the Spanish hero of the British invasion of
Manila, succeeded Raón as governor of the Philippines. As was customary, the
incoming governor conducted a residencia of the outgoing head of the colony.
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Anda found Raón, Cosio, Villacorta, and Basaraz guilty of various treasonous
crimes, especially regarding the proceedings of the expulsion of the Jesuits. The
former governor found it necessary to salvage his reputation by drawing up and
pointing to documents that exculpate him of any wrongdoings. But Raón,
Villacorta, and Basaraz all died of sickness (which, due to the slow
communication between Madrid and Manila and the conditions of the cell, was
not uncommon during this time). Cosio was the only one who lived long enough
to serve his sentence.113 He died in exile in Africa.114
To further cast doubt on the Jesuits’ surprise over the expulsion decree,
the Jesuits were very comfortable in the journey back to Europe, which means
they had enough time to adequately prepare for the voyage back home. Even
Cushner admitted: “But the Jesuits were well prepared for their trip. They
travelled “first class” for 250 pesos each (taken from their confiscated funds) and
were well supplied before leaving Manila. Among the rations given the 130
Fathers were 24,000 eggs, 428 picos of wheat, 3,000 chickens and 50 large pigs.
They were also allowed eleven Chinese servants who had to return to the
Philippines once they reached Acapulco. Among the servants were two cooks
and one barber.”115
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Conclusion
The members of the Society of Jesus clearly played various roles that
benefited their order by advancing its agenda, protecting its interests, and
shielding it from hostile elements. As ambassadors, counselors, confessors,
brokers, the Jesuit fathers were able to influence policy indirectly, leaving their
religious integrity intact. Working closely with people in very high places, the
Jesuits were sometimes seen as more political than religious, as the real power
behind the throne.116
In the colonial setting, the Society was at the forefront of evangelization.
Realizing that a policy of diplomacy and accommodation was the best way to
spread Christianity to non-believers, it was more effective than the other orders in
attracting followers. This resulted in its enviable position as the wealthiest and
most influential religious order in the Philippines, which, in the Philippines, said a
lot, as the power of the church was recognized to be much stronger than that of
the state.
With wealth, influence, and the favor of the colonial government, the
Society of Jesus established its supremacy over the Philippine Islands. Indeed, it
took a Pragmatic Sanction, a special royal decree of utmost importance in exigent
situations, from the king to take it down. But even then, the order was able to rely
upon the extensive network it had established to buttress it from the full impact of
that external force.
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Further still, the Jesuits demonstrated a level of political sophistication
that even the colonial civil authorities did not possess. They were not merely
political; they were strategically political. The political tactics and strategies they
implemented were skillfully devised and constructed to suit specific conditions.
Truly, their decision to have a more active part establishing Spain’s sovereignty
and legitimacy over the Philippines, and then switching to a more restrained,
subordinated role during the Corcuera administration, was nothing short of
masterful. Their participation in these two dramatically different instances
unequivocally displayed their political adroitness and talent in politics.
What is more, the Society of Jesus did value the end over the means, the
destination over the journey. Based on its moral philosophy, as discussed at the
beginning of this paper, it probably did not matter to the Jesuit fathers that some
of their means or journeys were not as Christian as they should have been. They
probably saw the importance of a well-funded and well-connected organization to
do god’s work, as they interpreted it. In the Constitution of the order, Ignatius, its
founder, affirmed the Society’s need to win “the good will and charity of all,..
especially of those whose favorable or unfavorable attitude toward it is of great
importance for opening or closing the gate leading to the service of God and the
good of souls.”117 This passage clearly articulates the order’s stance on matters of
moral ambiguity. The Jesuits believed that things are not always black or white;
decisions, methods, courses of actions – not entirely moral or Christian – are
made and followed.
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If the Society of Jesus was indeed more political than its rival religious
orders in the early modern setting, then what was further proven here is that the
order was able to recalibrate its involvement as needed, to tailor its practices to a
specific situation, and to recognize when to be on the offensive and when to be on
the defensive. This suggested a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness
brought about by conquest and evangelization. Furthermore, the Jesuit fathers
were not limited by their immediate geographical and temporal conditions. They
saw past these physical barriers; they planned ahead, and were not discouraged by
any setbacks. As missionaries, they were exemplary; as politicians, they were
enviable. In the early modern world, where religiosity and pragmatism comingled
in a precarious balance, these Jesuit fathers, indubitably, had the upper hand over
their rivals and proved themselves to be remarkably successful in managing their
global religious enterprise in an Asian colony.
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